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We study a general static noisy rational expectations model, where investors have private 
information about asset payoffs, with common and private components, and about their own 
exposure to an aggregate risk factor, and derive conditions for existence and uniqueness (or 
multiplicity) of equilibria. We find that a main driver of the characterization of equilibria is 
whether the actions of investors are strategic substitutes or complements. This latter property 
in turn is driven by the strength of a private learning channel from prices, arising from the 
multidimensional sources of asymmetric information, in relation to the usual public learning 
channel. When the private learning channel is strong (weak) in relation to the public we have 
strong (weak) strategic complementarity in actions and potentially multiple (unique) 
equilibria. The results enable a precise characterization of whether information acquisition 
decisions are strategic substitutes or complements. We find that the strategic substitutability 
in information acquisition result obtained in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) is robust. 
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This paper considers a general noisy rational expectations model of the CARA-
Gaussian class where traders receive both a signal about the asset payo⁄ and a
shock to their endowment, both private information. We characterize the linear
partially revealing equilibria of the model and show how public and private
learning from prices drives the strategic character of the actions (substitutes
or complements) of investors. The model uni￿es and generalizes the models
received in the literature.
The presence of multiple equilibria has proved important to explain crises
and crashes (e.g., Gennote and Leland (1990)), as well as showing the possi-
bility of strategic complementarity in information acquisition. However, in tra-
ditional rational expectations models with asymmetric information (Grossman
and Stiglitz (1980), Hellwig (1980), Diamond and Verrecchia (1981), Admati
(1985), Vives (1995), see ch. 4 in Vives (2008) for an overview) there exists
a unique linear partially revealing rational expectations equilibrium. An ex-
ogenously more informative price makes rational investors put less weight on
their private signal and generates a response which makes the equilibrium price
less informative.1 There is aggregate strategic susbtitutability in the actions
of informed investors and this implies that the equilibrium is unique. More-
over, stock prices are always more informative when more investors with private
information (about the liquidation value) trade. This implies that private infor-
mation is less valuable, and hence, traders have less incentives to get informed
as the fraction of informed traders increases. In short, there is strategic sub-
stitutability in information acquisition. In this paper we want to explore the
drivers of aggregate strategic susbtitutability or complementarity, and therefore
the conditions for multiplicity, as well as the links with the incentives to acquire
information.
Our model incorporates two essential features of modern trading in a ￿nan-
cial market. First, traders receive typically multidimensional private signals
about asset payo⁄s and aggregate risk factors. For example, the individual
exposure of an investor to an aggregate risk factor is typically his private infor-
mation. The aggregate risk factor may be a stock or derivatives index, a housing
price index, or a wage index. A risk averse investor will have an incentive to
hedge his exposure to such aggregate risks. The risk factor may be also an
aggregate liquidity shock. Second, the aggregate private information of traders
about the asset payo⁄ typically does not reveal its liquidation value, there is
residual uncertainty. Furthermore, the model we propose avoids the need for
noise traders, and relies only on rational traders. Nevertheless, our framework
is similar to an economy with private information on noisy supply.
We build a model of the CARA-Gaussian family with these features which
has as particular cases the main extant models in the literature. In our economy
a trader receives an endowment shock, which is his private information about
the aggregate endowment shock. An informed trader receives also a private sig-
1Vives (1993) explores the dynamic implications of this fact.
2nal about the asset payo⁄ with error term which is potentially correlated with
the error terms of the signals of other traders. This correlation may arise if
private signals are based on a common information source.2 With correlated
signals the collective information of informed investors does not reveal the asset
value, that is, there is residual uncertainty. Furthermore, the signal correlation
allows us to parameterize the degree of asymmetric information among informed
traders. This generalizes the models in the literature: Grossman and Stiglitz
(1980) assume that informed investors observe the same signal about the liqui-
dation value (perfectly correlated private signals errors); in contrast, Diamond
and Verrecchia (1981), or Hellwig (1980) assume that private signal errors are
uncorrelated. As we will see the assumption of uncorrelation among private
signal errors conditions some results.3
Our results are as follows. We obtain that when private signal noises among
informed traders are correlated the existence of a linear partially revealing ra-
tional expectations equilibrium is guaranteed, with the possibility of multiple
equilibria (in such a case typically three). Strong strategic complementarity
in actions of investors is the driver of potential multiplicity of equilibria. In
our model because of the presence of multiple sources of private information
there is both a private and a public learning channel from prices (as in Medrano
and Vives (2004) and Amador and Weill (2010)). The private learning channel
arises because an investor uses his own exposure to the aggregate risk factor
to improve his estimate of the asset payo⁄ when looking at the price. Then
an increase in the informativeness of the price about the asset payo⁄ generates
two e⁄ects. First, a trader ￿nds optimal to rely more on the information pro-
vided by the private channel. This tends to make investors￿actions strategic
complements, that is, when other investors￿demands rely more on their private
information, a trader has more incentives to rely more on his private infor-
mation. Second, a trader ￿nds optimal to rely more on the improved public
information and less on the private information. This classical channel tends
to make investors￿actions strategic substitutes, when other investors￿demands
rely more on their private information, a trader has less incentives to rely on his
private information. Which of the two e⁄ects dominates depends on parameter
values. However, for an investor who has no information on the asset payo⁄
strategic complementarity prevails. We obtain that when, on aggregate, actions
are either strategic substitutes or moderate strategic complements, the equilib-
rium is unique. Thus, a necessary condition for multiple equilibria is strong
strategic complementarities in actions, if this happens at relevant points then
the condition is su¢ cient.
2For instance, suppose that the private information signals are based on an internal ac-
counting report (where the information takes the form of the ￿rm￿ s value plus and error). In
this case the errors on private information signals will be correlated since all of them include
the error in the internal report.
3This happens in other models in the literature. In a model with coordination motives and
information choice, Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009) show that for the equilibrium to be unique,
signal noise across agents must be independent. These authors suggest that this independence
assumption should be well-founded because it is stringent and it ultimately determines the
predictions of their model.
3The forces that push for a low degree of strategic complementarity and
uniqueness of equilibrium therefore, are parameter constellations where the pri-
vate learning channel from prices is weak (and we approach a situation with
a unique source of asymmetric information). Those are when the fraction of
informed traders about the asset payo⁄ is large and the correlation among the
private signal errors is high, or when investors almost do not hold information
about the aggregate supply, or when informed investors about the asset payo⁄
have a low risk weighted information advantage.
With correlated signals when strategic complementarity in actions is mod-
erate the equilibrium is unique; when it is strong (at relevant points) then we
have three equilibria. Only the middle equilibrium in the multiple equilibria
situation displays strategic complementarity in information acquisition. How-
ever, it is unstable with respect to adaptive dynamics. In this sense the ￿nding
of strategic susbtitutability in information acquisition of Grossman and Stiglitz
(1980) is robust.4
There is an extensive literature on rational expectations models with asym-
metric information. Several extensions of the models proposed by Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980) and Diamond and Verrecchia (1981) show the possibility of mul-
tiple equilibria5 and the possibility of strategic complementarity in information
acquisition. Lundholm (1988) extends the rational expectations competitive
model of Diamond and Verrecchia (1981), assuming that each investor receives
both a public and a private signal. He proves the existence of a symmetric
linear rational expectations equilibrium, with the possibility of multiplicity of
such equilibria.6 Barlevy and Veronesi (2008) show that when fundamentals
and noise trading are correlated the existence of multiple equilibria and strate-
gic complementarity in information acquisition may arise.7 Ganguli and Yang
(2009) consider a variation of the model of Diamond and Verrecchia (1981)
where traders observe information about the aggregate supply of the stock and
where private signals have uncorrelated error terms. They prove that a linear
partially revealing rational expectations equilibrium may not exist. In case of
existence (except for a set of parameters of measure zero), there are two of such
4The only caveat is that there are some parameter constellations such that strategic sub-
stitutability in actions is so strong that the unique equilibrium is unstable.
5An early analysis of multiplicity is McCa⁄erty and Driskill (1980).
6The main focus of his paper is the analysis of some curious comparative statics results.
More precisely, Lundholm shows that when public and private signals￿ errors are positive
correlated, the equilibrium price of the risky asset may move inversely with a signal. This
contrasts with the intuitive result derived in rational expectations models with one risky
asset in which the equilibrium price of the risky security increases in the signals observed by
investors (see, for instance, Hellwig (1980) and Diamond and Verrecchia (1981)).
7Barlevy and Veronesi (2000) propose a model with risk-neutral traders who face a borrow-
ing constraint, in the presence of noise traders and where the fundamentals follow a binomial
distribution. They claim that as more traders acquire private information prices need not
become more informative and, consequently, investors may want to acquire more private in-
formation. However, Chamley (2008a) proves that the previous paper has a mistake in the
expression for the value of information. Barlevy and Veronesi (2008) presents a correction.
Other models where strategic complementarities in information acquisition arise are Hirshleifer
et al. (1994), Veldkmap (2006, a, b) and Chamley (2007).
4equilibria, in one equilibrium the market exhibits strategic complementarity in
information acquisition, while in the other there is strategic substitutability.
Our results show that the potential non-existence of equilibria in Ganguli and
Yang￿ s framework is not robust to small perturbations in the correlation coe¢ -
cient of private signal errors.
Medrano and Vives (2004), Amador and Weill (2010), and Hatchondo et
al. (2010) explore the implications of the private learning channel from prices
(respectively, on the welfare analysis of insider trading, on the welfare impact
of public information, and on the ampli￿cation e⁄ect of aggregate exposure on
asset prices) when individual exposures to an aggregate risk factor are private
information. In our model, as in Amador and Weill (2010), the strength of the
private learning channel from prices is the source of strategic complementarity in
actions. Goldstein et al. (2010) propose a model where the information revealed
in the course of a speculative attack is used by the central bank in its policy
decisions. Strategic complementarities among currency speculators arise due to
the feedback e⁄ect that the information in their trades has on the policy decision
of the central bank.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the
notation and the hypotheses of the model. Section 3 characterizes the sym-
metric linear equilibria in the general setup and analyzes existence, unique-
ness/multiplicity and stability properties of equilibria. Comparative statics and
information acquisition incentives are dealt with in Section 4 and some particu-
lar cases are analyzed in Section 5. Concluding remarks are presented in Section
6. Finally, proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
2 The model
Consider a static asset market model with di⁄erential information, where a
continuum of risk averse investors exchange a risky asset with liquidation value
v ￿ N(v;￿￿1
v ), and a riskless asset with unitary return.
Investor i 2 [0;￿] is (privately) informed about v. She has CARA prefer-
ences, is endowed with ui shares of the risky asset, and maximizes the expected
utility of her wealth: WI
i = vui +(v ￿p)xI
i; where WI
i represents the trader￿ s i
wealth and xI
i denotes the units of the risky asset traded by this agent. Thus,
U(WI
i ) = ￿expf￿WI
i =￿g where ￿ > 0 is the common degree of risk tolerance.
Each informed trader i:
￿ prior to trading receives a signal si = v +"i, where "i ￿ N(0;￿￿1
" ), v and
"i are independent for all i and cov("i;"j) = ￿￿￿1
" with ￿ 2 [0;1] for all
i;j;
￿ submits a demand schedule XI(si;ui;p), contingent on the private signal
si, on the endowment ui and on the price p.
Uninformed trader j 2 (￿;1] has also CARA preferences with the same
degree of risk tolerance as informed investors, and maximizes the expected utility
5of his wealth: WU
j = ujv + (v ￿ p)xU
j ; where WU
j represents the trader￿ s j
wealth and xU
j denotes the units of the risky asset traded by this agent. Thus,
U(WU
j ) = ￿expf￿WU
j =￿g. Each uninformed trader j:
￿ submits a demand schedule XU(uj;p), contingent on the private endow-
ment uj and on p.
Finally, assume that
￿ uh = u + ￿h, for all h 2 [0;1]; where the error terms ￿h are i.i.d., with
￿h ￿ N(0;￿￿1
￿ ), u ￿ N(u;￿￿1
u ) and u and ￿h are independent of all the
other random variables in the model,
￿ given u the average endowment shock reveals u, that is,
R 1
0 uhdh = u a.s.8





sidi = v +e ";
where e " = 1
￿
R ￿
0 "hdh is normally distributed with E [e "] = 0 and var[e "] =
￿￿￿1
￿ :
Some remarks on the model are in order:
1. We assume that private signals have correlated errors. This is equivalent
to having signals with i.i.d. errors, but with a common shock (like in
Grundy and McNichols (1989), for example).9 What we accomplish is
that the aggregate signal does not reveal v and therefore there is residual
uncertainty about the liquidation value. Still another related formulation
would be to have i.i.d. errors in the signals, but then have a common
shock to the liquidation value that is not observed (as in He and Wang
(1995), for example). Our formulation therefore should be considered the
general case with ￿ parameterizing the common component of the shock
in the signal residual uncertainty (from none with ￿ = 0 to a common
signal with ￿ = 1).
2. Our information structure allows for a private learning channel from prices.
This is so because uh is a private signal about the aggregate endowment
for investor h. Although the endowments are independent of v, investors
will ￿nd them useful when predicting v since they allow to disentangle
part of the noise in the price coming from the aggregate endowment. In
our economy investors have information about factors that are not related
to payo⁄s. In real markets, investors typically have not only information
8We adopt the convention that the Strong Law of Large Numbers holds (see the thecnical
appendix in Vives (2008)).
9Indeed, suppose that si = v + e " + ("i ￿e ") where e " ￿ N(0;￿￿￿1
" ) and
cov(("i ￿e ");("j ￿e ")) = 0 with ￿ 2 [0;1] for i 6= j.
6about the payo⁄s of assets but also about their exposure to some aggregate
shock or risk factor. For example, investors may want to hedge their non-
tradable capital (say human capital) in the stock market. This hedging
motive will be stronger the better the correlation of the returns of the
non-tradable asset and the stock market. In some other cases traders
may obtain information about noise trading or supply shocks. In any
case those individual signals or exposure to aggregate risk will constitute
private information to the trader and a source which will contribute to
multidimensional information in the market (see, for example, Medrano
and Vives (2004), Ganguli and Yang (2009), Amador and Weill (2009)
and Hatchondo et al. (2010)).
3. Finally, the model we propose avoids the need for noise traders, whose
presence has often been criticized in the literature. Nevertheless, our
framework is similar to an economy with private information on noisy
supply. Concretely, a closely related framework consists in an economy
where there are two types of agents: a continuum of rational investors
and noise traders. The rational investors are endowed only with a certain
amount of the riskless asset and no units of the risky asset. The aggre-
gate supply of the risky asset is driven by noise traders. All the rational
investors have private information about the supply of the risky asset and
some of them have private information about the liquidation value of the
risky asset. The results obtained in this alternative scenario will be similar
to ours.
3 Equilibrium characterization
We de￿ne ￿rst a rational expectations equilibrium and consider its implemen-
tation in a demand schedule game.
De￿nition: A rational expectations equilibrium (REE) is a set of trades,













and a (measurable) price functional p(v +e ";u) (i.e., prices measurable in (v +









j (uj;p)dj = 0 (a.s.); and
ii) traders in [0;1] optimize: given the price function p(v +e ";u),
XI












for i 2 [0;￿]; and
XU












for j 2 (￿;1]:
7Traders understand the relationship between prices and the underlying un-
certainty (v + e ";u): That is, they conjecture correctly the price function and
update their beliefs accordingly. Due to the presence of noise (u), the equilib-
rium typically will not be fully revealing.
It is well-known (see, for instance, ch. 4 in Vives (2008)) that there is a nat-
ural game in demand schedules which implements partially revealing REE. Let
traders therefore use demand schedules as strategies. Thus, once each trader
has received his private information, investors submit demand schedules con-
tingent on their private information to an auctioneer, who aggregates all the
speculators￿schedules. Then, the auctioneer ￿nds a market clearing price (as








a strategy of the informed investor i (uninformed in-






is a mapping from the set of her (his) private signals
to the set of demand functions. Thus, XI
i (si;ui;:) is a demand function of
the informed investor i corresponding to a given private information (si;ui).
Analogously, XU
j (uj;:) is a demand function of the uninformed investor j cor-




















j (uj;p)dj = 0 (a.s.).
To emphasize the dependence of the market clearing price on the strategies
of speculators, we write p = p(XI;XU): In a Bayesian equilibrium, given his
private information, each speculator chooses a demand function to maximize his
conditional expected utility, taking as given the strategies of other traders and
taking as given the price of the risky asset. We will restrict attention to linear
symmetric Bayesian equilibria of the demand schedule game.
De￿nition: A symmetric linear Bayesian equilibrium (SLE) is a Bayesian
equilibrium such that the demand functions are linear and identical, that is,
XI
i (si;ui;p) = B0 ￿ B1ui ￿ B2p + B3si; i 2 [0;￿]; and
XU
j (uj;p) = C0 ￿ C1uj ￿ C2p; j 2 (￿;1];
where B0;B1;B2;B3;C0;C1 and C2 are constants.
To solve for a SLE a standard approach is the following. First, positing
linear strategies for the traders, we ￿nd, using the market clearing condition,
an expression for p in terms of v +e " and u; as follows:





￿B2+(1￿￿)C2 and A2 =
￿B1+(1￿￿)C1
￿B2+(1￿￿)C2: Second,
we compute the asset demands for informed and uninformed types. Third, using
(1) we update beliefs about v: Finally, we identify coe¢ cients.
8Next, we are interested in deriving under which conditions there exists a
SLE. In order to perform this, ￿rst we express the coe¢ cients of the demand
functions in terms of the coe¢ cients of the price function (these expressions are
stated in the proof of the Proposition 1). Second, we write the coe¢ cients of
the price function as functions of a ratio, ￿ = A1
A2, and then, we characterize
this ratio as a solution of a ￿xed-point equation. If a solution of this equation
exists, then we conclude that there exists a SLE. Note that ￿ =
￿B3
￿B1+(1￿￿)C1 is
the ratio of the average responsiveness to the private signal on v to the average
sensitivity to the endowment shock. That is, it is roughly the ratio of how much
information the price reveals about the average signal v +e " in relation to how
much information about the aggregate shock u.
Proposition 1: Let ￿ = A1
A2: In a SLE, the coe¢ cients of the price function
satisfy
A0 = v ￿ A1v + A2u ￿
1
￿ (￿￿I + (1 ￿ ￿)￿U)
u;
A1 = 1 ￿
￿v














￿1 = ￿v +
￿
￿
2 (￿u + ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿"
￿
￿"










and ￿ is a solution of the following ￿xed-point equation:
￿ = f(￿) ￿ ￿￿
￿
￿￿￿











Moreover, if ￿ > 0; the existence of a SLE is guaranteed and there are at most
three equilibria.
Remark: The result related to the existence of a SLE is trivial. It follows
from the fact that f(0) = ￿￿￿" ￿ 0 and lim
￿!1
f(￿) ￿ ￿ < 0 whenever ￿ > 0: At
a SLE, ￿ ￿ 0 . When ￿￿" = 0; we have that ￿ = 0, otherwise ￿ > 0.
Note that the previous proposition shows that the result of non-existence of
a SLE for some parameter con￿gurations derived in Ganguli and Yang (2009),
where ￿ = 0; is not robust. A small perturbation in this correlation coe¢ cient
guarantees existence of such an equilibrium.
93.1 Strategic substitutability and strategic complemen-
tarity
In this subsection we derive the ￿xed-point equation given in (2) and relate the
slope of the function f(￿) to the character of the strategic interaction between
the investors. In particular, we analyze the relationship between the investors￿
optimal demands and the information provided by the price.
We start by noting that, provided ￿ > 0, observing the equilibrium price of
the risky asset is informationally equivalent to observing




The endogenous parameter ￿ is directly related to the informativeness of the
price about the aggregate signal v +e ".
Consider the informed trader i. Recall that her information set is given by
fsi;ui;pg: This information set is informationally equivalent to the following
three signals fsi;zi;zg: si = v + "i; zi = z + 1
￿ui = v + e " + 1
￿￿i; and z: This
is so since the endowment ui helps in extracting information on v in the price
(which depends on the aggregate shock u). The implication is that the price
increases investor i￿ s public information about v, through the signal z, and it
increases investor i￿ s private information about v, through the signal zi: We can
decompose trader i￿ s posterior forecast E(vjsi;zi;z) in a (purely) private and a
public component (similarly as in Amador and Weill (2010)):
Conditional on her private information, si and zi; and given a fully di⁄use
prior, trader i forms a private posterior belief that v is normally distributed









2 (1 ￿ ￿)
zi and
￿￿I ￿ (var(vjsi;zi))
￿1 = ￿" +
￿
2￿"￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
2
￿" + ￿
2￿￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
:
Conditional on the public signal z, and given the common prior, trader i forms
a public posterior belief that v is normally distributed with mean and precision:





















Finally, conditional on her information set, the posterior belief of trader i is
that v is normally distributed with mean
E(vjsi;zi;z) = !IE￿(vjsi;zi) +
￿
1 ￿ !I ￿ {I￿






2 (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿" (￿v + ￿") + ￿






2￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿" (￿v + ￿") + ￿





￿" (￿v + ￿") + ￿
2 (￿u + ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿)(￿" + ￿￿v)
￿" + (1 ￿ ￿)(￿u + ￿￿)￿￿
2 :
Note that when ￿ = 0 we have that {I = 0, and when ￿ = 1 we have that
1￿!I ￿{I = 0 (then only si is relevant for an informed agent, E￿(vjsi;zi) = si
and E(vjsi;zi;z) = E(vjsi) = ￿"
￿v+￿"si + ￿v
(￿v+￿")v). In both cases signals are
conditionally independent (in the ￿rst case about v and in the second case about
v +e ").
Now, consider the uninformed trader j. His information set fuj;pg is infor-
mationally equivalent to the following two signals: zj = z + 1
￿uj = v +e " + 1
￿￿j
and z: Performing a similar decomposition for trader j￿ s posterior belief, we get























Next, using the previous decompositions, we derive an expression for the
equilibrium price. Taking into account the transformations of the traders￿in-
















; for all j 2 (￿;1]:




























￿￿I + (1 ￿ ￿)￿U￿
p: (6)
Therefore, the market clearing condition implies that
p =
￿I R ￿
0 E(vjsi;zi;z)di + ￿U R 1
￿ E(vjzj;z)dj ￿ 1
￿u
￿￿I + (1 ￿ ￿)￿U : (7)
By virtue of (4) and (5), it follows that
Z ￿
0
E(vjsi;zi;z)di = !I￿(v +e ") + ￿
￿





E(vjzj;z)dj = !U(1￿￿)(v +e ")+(1￿￿)(1￿!U ￿{U)E(vjz)+(1￿￿){Uv:
Substituting these expressions in (7) and taking into account that E(vjz) is a
linear function of p, we get that observing p is equivalent to observing
v +e " ￿
1
￿ (￿￿I!I + (1 ￿ ￿)￿U!U)
u:
Comparing this formula with the expression of z stated in (3), we have that, in
equilibrium
￿ = f(￿) ￿ ￿￿I + (1 ￿ ￿)￿U; (8)
where ￿I = ￿￿I!I and ￿U = ￿￿U!U: Taking into account the expression of
aggregate demand given in (6) and the decompositions of investors￿beliefs given
in (4) and (5), Expression (8) shows that ￿ is a measure of sensibility of the
aggregate demand in the investors￿private information. Notice that if all private
forecasts increase in one unit, the aggregate demand rises ￿.
Substituting the expressions of ￿I and ￿U in (8), using the expressions
of ￿￿I; ￿; and ￿￿U, we get the ￿xed-point-equation stated in Proposition 1.
The function f(￿) can be understood as an aggregate (average) best response
function which yields the price informativeness, ￿ for short, out of the responses
of traders to changes to initial price informativeness. There is aggregate strategic
susbtitutability (complementarity) when f0(￿) < 0 (f0(￿) > 0) and a change in
￿ induces responses which decrease (increase) price informativeness. Strategic
susbtitutability is the traditional case in the Grossman-Stiglitz style models.












12Notice that when ￿ increases, that is, when other investors￿demands rely
more on their private information, prices are more informative about v. This
e⁄ect rises both the precision of public information ￿ and the precision of private
information ￿￿I: These increases have, in general, two opposite e⁄ects on the
term ￿I :
1) The increase in the precision of public information tends to decrease ￿I;
which means that an informed trader ￿nds optimal to rely more on the improved
public information and less on the private information. Thus, the endogenous
public signal generated by prices tends to make investors￿decisions strategic
substitutes, when other investors￿demands rely more on their private informa-
tion, an informed trader has less incentives to take her private information into
consideration. This is the usual e⁄ect in the Grossman-Stiglitz model.
2) The increase in the precision of private information tends to increase
￿I, which means that an informed trader ￿nds optimal to rely more on this
improved private information. Thus, the endogenous private signal generated
by prices tends to make investors￿decisions strategic complements, that is, when
other investors￿demands rely more on their private information, an informed
trader has more incentives to take her private information into consideration.
This e⁄ect arises out of the private learning channel of prices.













@￿ = 0 if ￿ = 1 and @￿
I
@￿ > 0 if and only if ￿ < ￿, where ￿ ￿
￿￿
￿u+￿￿
is the (squared) correlation coe¢ cient between u and ui. When ￿ is large
in relation to the the correlation of private signal errors, the private learning
channel from prices dominates for informed investors (and @￿
I
@￿ > 0).
The intuition for these results is as follows: When ￿ = 1; the price does not
provide any additional information in the prediction of v to informed traders,
and consequently, the individual only takes into account si: Hence, ￿I; the sensi-
bility of an informed trader￿ s demand to her private information is independent
of ￿: By contrast, whenever ￿ < 1; the price provides extra information when
predicting v. If ￿ is very large or if ￿￿ is very low, the expression for ￿￿I tells
us that ￿￿I increases with ￿; but varies very little: This implies that the ￿rst
e⁄ect dominates, and hence, @￿
I
@￿ < 0. Otherwise, if ￿ is low or ￿￿ is large, then
the change of ￿￿I due to an increase of beta is signi￿cative and this makes the
second e⁄ect to dominate, which implies @￿
I
@￿ > 0. Thus, for informed investors,
the private learning channel from prices is important if the (squared) correla-
tion coe¢ cient between u and ui;
￿￿
￿u+￿￿; is large in relation to the correlation
of private signal errors.
A similar reasoning may be done for an uninformed trader since in this case











Again an increase in ￿ rises both the precision of public information ￿ and
the precision of private information ￿￿I: In general, the ￿rst e⁄ect tends to
decrease ￿U and the second e⁄ect tends to increase ￿U: However, the overall










indicating that for the uninformed traders the second e⁄ect always prevails.
Note that even if the value of ￿￿ is low, we have that @￿
U
@￿ > 0: The reason is
that when ￿￿ is low, the second e⁄ect is low since ￿￿U varies little with respect
to ￿; but the ￿rst e⁄ect is also low since ￿U varies little with respect to ￿; given
that in this case ￿￿U is low.
Comparative statics of f0(￿) allows us to determine which parameters am-
plify/narrow potential strategic complementarities/substitutabilities in the ac-
tions of investors. We obtain:
f0(￿) = ￿




2￿(￿u + ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿"







Note that if ￿ = 1, sign(f0(￿)) = sign((￿ ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)); where ￿ =
￿￿
￿u+￿￿. For
￿ < 1 we have that f0(￿) > 0 if and only if ￿ > ￿. Straightforward computations
yield the following result:
Corollary 2: a) If ￿ 6= 0; then @








c) If ￿￿￿￿(￿u + ￿￿) ￿ 0 (that is, when informed traders￿actions are strate-
gic complements), then @
@￿f0(￿) ￿ 0; @
@￿"f0(￿) ￿ 0 and @
@￿uf0(￿) ￿ 0:





The result in b) follows directly from the expressions of ￿I = ￿￿I!I and
￿U = ￿￿U!U: The second part of this corollary tells us that a change in the
risk tolerance coe¢ cient ampli￿es/narrows the potential strategic complemen-
tarity/substitutability in actions.
3.2 Uniqueness/multiplicity of equilibrium
In this subsection we derive su¢ cient conditions for the uniqueness of SLE in
the general setup. In other words, we obtain su¢ cient conditions for the graph
of function f(￿) and the 45-degree line to intersect once. Note that when we have
14(aggregate) strategic susbtitutability -the function f(￿) is decreasing ( f0(￿) < 0)-
or when (aggregate) strategic complementarity is moderate -the 45-degree line
is steeper than the function f(￿) (f0(￿) < 1) -, the uniqueness of equilibrium is
guaranteed. The following corollary provides the parameter con￿gurations for
these two cases:




(1 ￿ ￿), then f0(￿) < 0 and
there exists a unique SLE.
b) If 27
64￿2￿￿￿"￿ < ￿; then f0(￿) < 1 and there exists a unique SLE.







and the fraction of uninformed traders is small enough.
Taking into account that f0(￿) = ￿@￿
I
@￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)@￿
U
@￿ ; it follows that f0(￿) <
0 for all ￿, leading to a unique equilibrium. In relation to b) note that if
27
64￿2￿￿￿"￿ < ￿; then @￿
U









@￿ < 1 for all ￿; which warrants uniqueness of equilib-
rium.
From the corollary it emerges that the forces for strategic substitutability,
and uniqueness of equilibrium therefore, are parameter constellations where the
private learning channel for prices is weak (and we approach a situation with a
unique source of asymmetric/diverse information). Those are when the fraction
of informed traders is large (￿ high) and the correlation among the private signal
errors is high (￿ high), or when investors almost do not hold information about
the aggregate supply (￿ or ￿￿ low). The same forces together when informed
investors have a low risk weighted information advantage about v (￿￿" low)
push for low strategic complementarity.
It is important to remark that all these results allows us to conclude that
a necessary condition for multiple equilibria is the presence of strong strategic
complementarities in actions at relevant points. However, the derivation of
su¢ cient conditions on the primitives that guarantee multiplicity of equilibria
in this general setup is not easy. In Section 5, we study particular cases and,
then, necessary and su¢ cient for multiplicity of equilibria are obtained.
3.3 Stability
Until now, we have shown that generically a SLE exists, with the possibility
of multiple equilibria. As usual in these cases, the natural question is whether
there exists a plausible selection device which implies that traders coordinate
on a speci￿c equilibrium. A standard criteria for selecting among equilibria is
stability.10
Consider that the economy is in equilibrium. Thus, ￿ = f(￿): Suppose
that there is a small perturbation in ￿; such that the price is informationally
10There is a long literature on learning and stability of REE (see Blume, Bray and Easley
(1982) and Section 7.1 in Vives (2008) for an introduction).
15equivalent to v+e "￿ 1
￿0u: Then, the agents modify their demands and, in particu-






; for the informed
traders and uninformed traders respectively. The aggregate weight becomes
f(￿






. The question is if the economy will go back
to the original ￿ or not according to best reply dynamics with the aggregate
best response function f(￿):11 This leads to the following de￿nition:
De￿nition: A SLE is stable (unstable) if and only if its corresponding value
for ￿ is a stable (unstable) ￿xed point for the best response function f(￿) (i.e.,
if and only if its corresponding value for ￿ satis￿es jf0(￿)j < 1).
Note that if f0(￿) > 0 and there are three (regular) equilibria (that is, for
which f0(￿) 6= 1) then necessarily the extremal ones are stable and the middle
one unstable. If f0(￿) < 0 the equilibrium will be unique but may be unstable if
strategic susbtitutability is strong enough (and jf0(￿)j > 1).
4 Comparative statics and information acquisi-
tion
We derive some comparative statics results and apply them to analyze the in-
centives to acquire information about the asset payo⁄.
4.1 Some comparative statics
We now analyze how some parameters a⁄ect the information that the price
reveals about the liquidation value and about the aggregate supply. Using the
expression of the equilibrium price, we get that the informational content of the
price about the liquidation value and the aggregate supply is given by
(var(vjp))










Remark: As ￿ is independent of ￿v; the previous expressions tell us that
@
@￿v (var(vjp))
￿1 > 0 and @
@￿v (var(ujp))
￿1 > 0 in any equilibrium:
Next, we analyze the e⁄ect of a change in the risk tolerance coe¢ cient and





















11This de￿nition is similar to the one used by Chamley (2008b) when studying the stability
of equlibria in Ganguli and Yang (2009).
16Since @
@￿ (var(vjp))
￿1 > 0 and @
@￿ (var(ujp))






















), for & = ￿ and ￿:
In order to obtain how ￿ changes with respect to & = ￿ and ￿ we have to see
how f(￿) moves with ￿ and ￿. It is easy to see that f(￿) is strictly increasing in
￿ and ￿, that is, ceteris paribus, more risk tolerance or more informed traders
make the aggregate demand to be more sensible to private information (note
that the weight that informed agents put on private information is higher than
the one put by uninformed ones). It follows that for regular equilibria (for
which f0(￿) 6= 1), sign(
@￿
@& ) = sign(1 ￿ f0(￿)). It follows that for any regular
equilibrium increasing ￿ or ￿ will increase ￿ except if at the equilibrium f0 (￿) >
1 (in which case ￿ decreases). This means that for any regular equilibrium with
f0 (￿) < 1 we have that increasing ￿ or ￿ increases the informativeness of the
price about the asset value in relation to the aggregate endowment shock. When
f0 (￿) > 1, the opposite happens.
If ￿ > 0 there are generically either one or three regular equilibria. If ￿ = 0
we know that there are generically two regular equilibria when they exist, and
the equilibrium with the highest ￿ is unstable (Ganguli and Yang (2009)).
This allows us to obtain the following result:
Proposition 4: In a regular equilibrium with f0 (￿) < 1, (var(vjp))
￿1
strictly increases with both ￿ and ￿ and (var(ujp))
￿1 strictly decreases with
both ￿ and ￿. If f0 (￿) > 1, results are reversed.
Note that if we are on the middle unstable equilibrium of three equilibria
and ￿ or ￿ increase adaptive dynamics will converge to the higher equilibrium,
increasing ￿ (and this will happen even if the unstable equilibrium disappears,
see Figure 1 and see the movement of f (￿) from the middle to the upper branch
increasing ￿). When ￿ = 0 and if we are on the high unstable equilibrium, if ￿
or ￿ increases, adaptive dynamics will diverge.
17Figure 1. The function f(￿) for ￿ = 3
2; ￿ = 3 and ￿ = 5 (and ￿ = 1; ￿￿ = 1;
￿u = 1; ￿ = 1
50 and ￿" = 1).
When ￿ > 0, if we are in a critical equilibrium and if ￿ or ￿ increase then
the critical equilibrium will disappear and adaptive dynamics will settle on a
higher equilibrium (see Figure 2 where the situation is illustrated by increasing
￿ from ￿ = 2:3134 to 3).
18Figure 2.The function f(￿) for ￿ = 3
2; ￿ = 2:3134 and ￿ = 3 (and ￿ = 1;
￿￿ = 1; ￿u = 1; ￿ = 1
17 and ￿" = 1).
We see therefore that unambiguous comparative statics results can be de-
rived even for critical and unstable equilibria (see Vives (1990) and Echenique
(2002) for general results).
4.2 Information acquisition incentives
Next, we analyze the possibility of strategic complementarity in information
acquisition. Strategic complementarity (substitutability) in information acqui-
sition means that traders have more (less) incentives to get informed as the
















denote the ex-ante expected indirect utility of an
informed trader and an uninformed trader, respectively, gross of information
costs.
De￿nition: A market exhibits strategic complementarity (substitutability)
in information acquisition if R0(￿) < 0 (R0(￿) > 0).







This result tells us that, similar to Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), the value
of information about the liquidation value of the risky asset is related to the
square root of the ratio of the precision of uninformed traders to the preci-
sion of informed traders. It is easy to see from the expressions for ￿U and ￿I





. That is, we have strategic substitutability or
19strategic complementarity in information acquisition depending on whether an
increase in the proportion of informed increases or decreases the informative-
ness of price (in relation to v + e "). When ￿
0 (￿) > 0 (￿
0 (￿) < 0)) increasing
￿ makes the price more informative about the payo⁄ and decreases (increases)
the incentives to acquire information. The result of strategic substitutability
(￿
0 (￿) > 0) is the one in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). From the results on
comparative statics the following proposition follows.
Proposition 6: If ￿ > 0 the market exhibits strategic substitutability in
information acquisition at regular extremal equilibria. When there are three
SLE, the market exhibits strategic complementarity in information acquisition
in the equilibrium whose value of ￿ is intermediate. If ￿ = 0 the market exhibits
strategic substitutability (complementarity) in information acquisition at the low
(high) ￿ regular equilibrium.
The equilibria in which the market exhibits strategic complementarity in in-
formation acquisition are unstable. If we discard those, we are left with strate-
gic substitutability in information acquisition as in the Grossman and Stiglitz
model. Under adaptive dynamics, starting either at unstable or critical equilib-
ria the system will converge to an equilibrium with larger ￿ and R.12 In all cases
we end up therefore with strategic substitutability in information acquisition.
This result could be modi￿ed if agents could acquire information either about
the payo⁄ and the noisy supply together or not at all. In this case an equilib-
rium of the Grossman-Stiglitz type could display strategic complementarity in
information acquisition for some con￿guration of the precision of the signals (see
Proposition 5 in Ganguli and Yang (2009) for the case ￿ = 0).
5 Particular cases
The general framework presented above encompasses several of the main models
presented in the literature of market microstructure.
Example 1: ￿￿ = 0 (a generalization of Diamond and Verrecchia (1981)).
This is the classical case of the noise trader model but generalized to allow
for correlated errors in the private signals and for the presence of informed and





2￿￿u (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿"
;
f(￿) is decreasing in ￿ and we have strategic susbtitutability. The intuition
of this property is the following. In this example, as in traditional rational
expectations models, uninformed traders do not hold any private information,
whereas informed traders only have private information about the liquidation
12An exception is when there is a unique unstable equilibrium (with strong strategic sus-
btitutability). Then a perturbation would induce divergence.
20value of the risky asset. This has two e⁄ects. First, uninformed traders￿demands
depend only on public information, that is, ￿U = 0; and hence, @￿
U
@￿ = 0.
Second, in relation to informed traders, the precision of private information
￿￿I = ￿" (and hence, independent of ￿). This implies that the private learning
channel e⁄ect of a change in ￿ on ￿I vanishes. Consequently, informed investors￿
decisions are strategic substitutes in actions, that is, @￿
I
@￿ < 0. Combining these
results, as f(￿) = ￿￿I + (1 ￿ ￿)￿U; it follows that f(￿) is decreasing in ￿:
The fact that the function f(￿) is decreasing leads to uniqueness of equilib-
rium. When there is strong strategic substitutability in actions, the function
f(￿) is decreasing and it has a very steep slope. In this case the equilibrium is
unstable. In the remainder situations the equilibrium is stable. These results
are summarized in the following corollary:
Corollary 7: If ￿￿ = 0; a SLE exists and is unique. The equilibrium is
stable if and only if 4
￿2￿2￿u￿" > (1 ￿ ￿)￿:
Corollary 7 indicates that when ￿ takes extreme values, near 1 or near zero,
the equilibrium is stable. This is due to the fact that, when the value of ￿ is
extreme, the classical public learning channel e⁄ect of a change in ￿ on ￿I is
moderate. Note that, when ￿ is near 0, the expression ￿I = H(￿￿I;￿) indicates
that the e⁄ect of ￿ on ￿I is small. On the other hand, when ￿ is near 1, the
increase in the public precision, ￿; due to a rise in ￿ is small. This implies
that in both cases the strategic substitutability in actions of informed traders
is moderate, and hence, the equilibrium is stable.
Example 2: ￿ = 0 (Ganguli and Yang (2009)).






+ (1 ￿ ￿)￿￿
2￿￿;
f(￿) is increasing in ￿ and we have strategic complementarity. In this particular
case we can explicitly obtain the equilibrium values for ￿:
Corollary 8: Suppose that ￿ = 0: If 1 < 4￿"￿￿￿￿2; then a SLE does
not exist. Otherwise, that is, if 1 ￿ 4￿"￿￿￿￿2; then we have the following












Moreover, the equilibrium with the lowest value of ￿ is stable, whereas the other
one is unstable.13
13The stability analysis in the model of Ganguli and Yang (2009) has been performed by
Chamley (2008b) and Heinemann (2010). Our result coincides with the one in Chamley
(2008b). Note however that the lower equilibrium may be unstable under eductive learning
for some parameter con￿gurations (see Heinemann (2010), and Guesnerie (2002) for a general
overview of the concept). The lower equilibrium is always stable under adaptive learning and
the higher one is not (see Heinemann (2010)).
21Corollary 8 shows that when private signals are very precise (￿" and ￿￿ high
enough) there is no equilibrium. The intuition is the following. If ￿" is high
enough, although prices are almost not informative (￿ low), informed investors￿
weights on private information, ￿I; and, hence, the average weight f(￿), are
high. If this is combined with factors that favor strategic complementarities in
actions (for instance, ￿￿ high enough), the result is that there is no intersec-
tion between the function f(￿) and the 45-degree line, and hence, there is no
equilibrium. Finally, to illustrate the results derived in Corollary 8, we plot the
following ￿gure:
Figure 3. The function f(￿) for ￿" = 1 (dotted curve) and ￿" = 1
4 (solid
curve), and the 45-degree line (with ￿ = 0; ￿￿ = 1; ￿ = 1
2 and ￿ = 1).
Figure 3 shows that the graph of the function f(￿) for ￿" = 1 (dotted curve)
is located above the 45-degree line. This implies that when ￿" = 1 there is no
equilibrium. By contrast, the graph of the function f(￿) for ￿" = 1
4 (solid curve)
intersects twice with the 45-degree line, and therefore, in this case there are two
equilibria.
Example 3: ￿ = 1 (a generalization of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)).
In this model (similar to the model in Section 4.4 in Vives (2008)) there
are informed (with traders receiving the same signal about v) and uniformed
like in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) but traders receive another piece of private
information on noisy supply. In this case
f(￿) = ￿￿"
￿










￿u+￿￿; f(￿) is increasing in ￿ and we have strategic complementarity.
Corollary 9: Suppose that ￿ = 1: If (1 ￿ ￿)￿ = 0; there is a unique SLE.
Otherwise,
if ￿ ￿ ￿(￿ + 8) < 0; there is a unique SLE,
if ￿ ￿ ￿(￿ + 8) > 0 and ￿ > ￿; there is a unique SLE,
if ￿ ￿ ￿(￿ + 8) > 0 and ￿ < ￿; there is a unique SLE,
if ￿ ￿ ￿(￿ + 8) > 0 and ￿ = ￿ or ￿ = ￿; there are two SLE,




; there are three SLE,














Before interpreting the results stated in Corollary 9, we plot several ￿gures
illustrating the di⁄erent situations when ￿ = 1.
Figure 4. The function f(:) and the 45-degree line (with ￿ = 1; ￿￿ = 1;
￿u = 1; ￿ = 1
2; ￿" = 1 and ￿ = 1).
In Figure 4, the selected parameter values satisfy ￿ ￿ ￿(￿ + 8) < 0. Con-
sistent with Corollary 9 there is a unique equilibrium.
Figure 2 illustrates a particular case in which ￿￿￿(￿ + 8) = 0: As Corollary
9 indicates, in this case that independent of the value of ￿, there is a unique
equilibrium.
23Figure 5. The function f(￿) for ￿ = ￿ = 3:6503 (dotted curve) and ￿ =
￿ = 2:6594 (solid curve), where ￿ = 1; ￿￿ = 1; ￿u = 1; ￿ = 1
50 and ￿" = 1:
Figure 5 shows that when the parameter ￿ takes the critical values, ￿ and ￿;




, there is a unique




there are three equilibria.
The intuition of the results is as follows. Notice that if ￿ = 1, the price
does not provide any extra information about v to informed traders, and conse-
quently, informed investors only take into account their private signal about v.
Hence, ￿I does not vary with ￿. If ￿ is high enough or ￿ is low enough (because
of ￿￿ is low or ￿u is high), on aggregate, strategic complementarities in actions
are moderate and this leads to a unique equilibrium. Otherwise, if ￿ is low
enough or ￿ is high enough, then the number of equilibria will depend on the
investors￿risk tolerance coe¢ cient ￿: Generically, there are three possibilities:
1) When ￿ is very high (￿ > ￿), strategic complementarities are very strong
and the function f(￿) has a sharply increasing S-shape. It has a unique inter-
section with the 45-degree line in the upper branch of the S, and consequently,
uniqueness of the equilibrium.




), the S-shape rises more slowly and
we get 3 intersections, and consequently, three equilibria.
3) If ￿ is very low (￿ < ￿), strategic complementarities in actions are mod-
erate. Hence, the function f(￿) is increasing, but very ￿ at. Consequently, there
is a unique intersection, and hence, a unique equilibrium.
With regard to the stability of equilibria, since f0(￿) > 0 we know that
regular extremal equilibria are stable and whenever there are three equilibria
the middle one is unstable. In case of two SLE, there is one stable equilibrium
and one unstable equilibrium (with f0(￿) = 1). Note that there can be a single
24equilibrium and be unstable (as in the middle branch in Figure 2).




2 (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿"
￿u+￿￿
￿





￿u+￿￿; and sign(f0(￿)) = sign((￿ ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)). For ￿ < 1 we have
that f0(￿) > 0 if and only if ￿ > ￿. That is, if the (squared) correlation coe¢ cient
between u and ui is large in relation to the correlation of private signal errors,




Corollary 10: Suppose that ￿ = 1: If (￿ ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 0, then f0(￿) < 0
and there is a unique SLE. Otherwise,
if ￿ ￿ 9￿ < 0; there is a unique SLE,
if ￿ ￿ 9￿ > 0 and ￿ > ￿; there is a unique SLE,
if ￿ ￿ 9￿ > 0 and ￿ < ￿; there is a unique SLE,
if ￿ ￿ 9￿ > 0 and ￿ = ￿ or ￿ = ￿; there are two SLE,




; there are three SLE,




(18￿￿ ￿ 27￿2 + ￿2) ￿ (￿ ￿ 9￿)
p
(￿ ￿ 9￿)(￿ ￿ ￿)




(18￿￿ ￿ 27￿2 + ￿2) + (￿ ￿ 9￿)
p
(￿ ￿ 9￿)(￿ ￿ ￿)
8￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿2￿" (￿u + ￿￿)
:
Again, in order to illustrate results stated in Corollary 10, we plot several
￿gures.
25Figure 6. The function f(￿) and the 45-line where ￿ = 1;￿ = 2
3;￿￿ = 1;
￿u = 1; ￿" = 2
5 and ￿ = 3
2:
The parameters values used in Figure 6 satisfy (￿ ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 0 and
consistently with Corollary 10, investors￿decisions are strategic substitutes, f(￿)
is decreasing, and there is a unique equilibrium.
Figure 7. The function f(￿) for ￿ = 1
4; ￿ = ￿ = ￿ = 0:59409, and ￿ = 1,
where ￿ = 1;￿ = 1
18;￿￿ = 1; ￿u = 1 and ￿" = 1.
26In Figure 7, the selected parameter values satisfy ￿ ￿ 9￿ = 0: As Corollary
10 indicates, whenever ￿ ￿ 9￿ = 0; independent of the value of ￿, there is a
unique equilibrium.
Figure 8. The function f(￿) when ￿ = ￿ = 0:61215 (solid curve) and when
￿ = ￿ = 0:83345 (dotted curve), where ￿ = 1; ￿ = 1
50; ￿￿ = 1; ￿u = 1 and
￿" = 2
5.
In Figure 8, the parameter ￿ takes the critical values, ￿ and ￿: In these cases
there are two equilibria. For all ￿ > ￿ (￿ < ￿); the graph of f(￿) is located above
(below) the dotted (solid) curve, and we get a unique intersection with the 45-




; the graph of f(￿) is located between the solid
and the dotted curve and we will have three intersections with the 45-degree
line. This is illustrated in Figure 9, assuming that ￿ = 0:5; ￿ = 0:7 and ￿ = 1.
27Figure 9. The function f(￿) for ￿ = 0:5; ￿ = 0:7, and ￿ = 1, where ￿ = 1;
￿ = 1
50; ￿￿ = 1; ￿u = 1 and ￿" = 2
5.
From the last two ￿gures, we obtain that:
1) When ￿ is very high (￿ > ￿), strategic complementarities in actions are
very strong and the function f(￿) has a sharply increasing S-shape. It has a
unique intersection with the 45-degree line in the upper branch of the S, and
consequently, uniqueness of the equilibrium.




), the S-shape rises more slowly and
we get 3 intersections, and consequently, three equilibria.
1) If ￿ is very low (￿ < ￿), strategic complementarities in actions are mod-
erate. Hence, the function f(￿) is increasing but very ￿ at. Consequently, it has
a unique intersection, and hence, uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Let us examine the stability of equilibria.
Corollary 11: Suppose that ￿ = 1, 0 < ￿ < 1 and ￿ > 0:
a) If ￿ ￿ ￿; we have strategic complementarity, regular extremal equilibria
are stable and whenever there are three equilibria the middle one is unstable. In
case of two SLE, there is one stable equilibrium and one unstable equilibrium
(with f0(￿) = 1).
b) If ￿ < ￿, we have strategic susbtitutability and
b.1) if ￿ < ￿ ￿ 9￿; the unique equilibrium is stable.
b.2) if ￿ > 9￿; then we have two possibilities
if ￿ = 2 (￿1;￿2); the equilibrium is stable,







12￿2 ￿ 9￿￿ + ￿2 + (4￿ ￿ ￿)
￿p
(￿ ￿ 9￿)(￿ ￿ ￿)
￿￿
￿3 (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿9￿ + 5￿ ￿ 3
p
(￿ ￿ 9￿)(￿ ￿ ￿)
￿








12￿2 ￿ 9￿￿ + ￿2 + (￿ ￿ 4￿)
p




￿9￿ + 5￿ + 3
p
(￿ ￿ 9￿)(￿ ￿ ￿)
￿
￿" (￿u + ￿￿)
.
The results in this section con￿rm the forces (parameter constellations) for
strategic substitutability, and uniqueness of equilibrium therefore. Those are
when the fraction of informed traders is large (￿ high) and the correlation among
the private signal errors is high (￿ high), or when investors almost do not hold
information about the aggregate supply (￿ low). The same forces together when
informed investors have a low risk weighted information advantage about v (￿￿"
low) push for low strategic complementarity. To those we add the case where
informed investors have a very precise information about v (￿" very high).
6 Concluding remarks
This paper suggests that the type of information observed by market partici-
pants a⁄ects the existence and the number of partially revealing rational expec-
tations equilibria. Strong strategic complementarities in the actions of investors
are the driver of multiplicity of equilibria. A necessary condition for multiplic-
ity of equilibria is the presence of multiple sources of asymmetric information,
leading to a private learning channel from public signals. This channel induces
strategic complementarities in the actions of investors and when it is strong
enough it overpowers the classical e⁄ect of more public information implying
less weight on private signals, leading to strategic substitutability in actions.
Several extensions are left for future research. A ￿rst one is to develop
the welfare analysis in our market. A second one is to explore the dynamic
implications of the model. A third one is to develop the analysis in a framework
with strategic traders instead of price-taking ones.
7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Consider the informed trader i: Suppose that this agent
conjectures the functional form of the price given by (1). The maximization



















Using the expression of the ￿nal wealth of this agent, we have
E(WI









Substituting these expressions in the objective function and maximizing with
respect to xI
i; the ￿rst order condition implies that
xI
i = ￿



















2 + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(￿u + ￿￿)A2
1
(￿" + ￿￿v)(1 ￿ ￿)(￿u + ￿￿)A2
1 + ￿" (￿v + ￿")A2
2
:
Substituting these expressions into (9), we get
xI





(1 ￿ ￿)￿"A1 (￿(￿u + ￿￿)A0 + ￿uA2u)





B1 = 1 ￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿"￿￿A1A2





(1 ￿ ￿)(￿u + ￿￿)(A1 (￿" + ￿￿v) ￿ ￿")A1 + A2
2￿" (￿v + ￿")












Consider now the uninformed trader j. Suppose that this agent conjectures
that the price has the functional form given in (1). The maximization problem



















30Using the expression of the ￿nal wealth of this agent, we have
E(WU









Substituting these expressions in the objective function and maximizing with
respect to xU
j ; the ￿rst order condition implies that
xU
j = ￿




Again applying standard normal theory, we get

















Plugging these expressions into (10), we have
xU
























Using the optimal demands for all investors, the market clearing condition im-
plies that
p =
￿B0 + (1 ￿ ￿)C0 ￿ (￿B1 + (1 ￿ ￿)C1)u + ￿B3 (v +e ")
￿B2 + (1 ￿ ￿)C2
:
Equating coe¢ cients according to (1)
A0 =
￿B0 + (1 ￿ ￿)C0




￿B2 + (1 ￿ ￿)C2
and (12)
A2 =
￿B1 + (1 ￿ ￿)C1
￿B2 + (1 ￿ ￿)C2
: (13)


























31Let ￿ = A1






2 + c1￿ + c0;
where
c5 = ￿2 (1 ￿ ￿)(￿u + ￿￿)
2 ;
c4 = ￿(￿ ￿ 1)￿"￿￿ (￿u + ￿￿)￿;
c3 = ￿(2 ￿ ￿)(￿u + ￿￿)￿";
c2 = ￿￿2





Straightforward computations yield that ￿ is a zero of the polynomial P(￿)
i⁄ ￿ is a solution of the ￿xed-point equation stated in this proposition. The
result related to the existence of a SLE is trivial. It follows from the fact that
f(0) = ￿￿￿" > 0 and lim
￿!1
f(￿) < 1 whenever ￿ 6= 0:
Next, we derive the expressions of A2; A1 and A0 as functions of ￿: Using
the expressions of the coe¢ cients B￿ s and C￿ s, from (13), direct computations
yield the desired expression for A2:
Concerning the expression of A1; notice that substituting the expression of
￿I and ￿U in 1 ￿ ￿v
(￿￿I+(1￿￿)￿U) and operating, we get
1￿
￿v





















































Substituting this expression in the RHS of the previous equality and operating,
we get 1 ￿ ￿v
￿￿I+(1￿￿)￿U = A1:
In relation to the expression of A0; note that isolating A0 from (11), operat-
ing taking into account the expressions of A1 and A2; we get the desired formula
for A0.
Finally, concerning the upper bound for the number of SLE, we have that the
number of SLE is the same as the number of the roots of the polynomial P(￿):
Notice that if ￿ is either 0 or 1, then P(￿) has degree two or three. Therefore,
the result is trivial. Suppose that ￿ 6= 0;1: By virtue of Rolle￿ s Theorem, to
show the result it is enough to prove that there exists a unique ￿ such that
P00(￿) = 0: Di⁄erentiating we have
P00(￿) = 20c5￿
3 + 12c4￿
2 + 6c3￿ + 2c2 and
P000(￿) = 60c5￿
2 + 24c4￿ + 6c3:
32We distinguish three cases:
Case 1: 2￿2(1 ￿ ￿)￿"￿2
￿ < 5(2 ￿ ￿)￿(￿u + ￿￿).
In this case P000(￿) hasn￿ t real roots. The fact that c3 > 0 implies that
P000(￿) > 0 for all ￿; and consequently, P00(￿) is strictly increasing. Moreover,
since lim
￿!￿1
P00(￿) = ￿1 and lim
￿!+1
P00(￿) = +1; we conclude that in this case
P00(￿) has a unique real root.
Case 2: 2￿2(1 ￿ ￿)￿"￿2
￿ = 5(2 ￿ ￿)￿(￿u + ￿￿):
In this case P000(￿) has a unique real root, denoted by ￿
0. The fact that
c3 > 0 implies that P000(￿) > 0 for all ￿ 6= ￿
0; and consequently, P00(￿) is
strictly increasing for all ￿ 6= ￿
0. As before, since lim
￿!￿1
P00(￿) = ￿1 and
lim
￿!+1
P00(￿) = +1; we conclude that in this case P00(￿) has a unique real root.
Case 3: 2￿2(1 ￿ ￿)￿"￿2
￿ > 5(2 ￿ ￿)￿(￿u + ￿￿):
In this case P000(￿) has two real roots, given by:
￿1 =







￿￿2 (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 5￿(￿u + ￿￿)(2 ￿ ￿)
￿
10(1 ￿ ￿)￿(￿u + ￿￿)
and
￿2 =







￿￿2 (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 5￿(￿u + ￿￿)(2 ￿ ￿)
￿
10(1 ￿ ￿)￿(￿u + ￿￿)
;




and after some tedious computations, we obtain that P00(￿1) < 0: Hence, we
have that P00(￿) has a unique root.
Proof of Proposition 3: a) In order to prove uniqueness, it su¢ ces to show
that the inequality given in the statement of the corollary guarantees that the
function f(￿) is decreasing for all ￿ ￿ 0: Doing some computations we have


















expression in the LHS of this inequality is a decreasing function in ￿; whenever






￿ 1: Thus, if the inequality
1 ￿ ￿(￿￿
￿1￿1)(1￿￿)
(1￿￿) holds, we can assure that f(￿) is decreasing for all ￿ ￿ 0:





















































(￿u+￿￿)￿ < 1; then
33@￿
U









1 for all ￿; which warrants uniqueness of equilibrium.
Next, we state a lemma that will be applied in the proof of Corollary 5.
Lemma A.1. Let z ￿ N(0;￿) and W = c+b0z +z0Az, where c 2 R, b 2 Rn,

















Proof. See Danthine and Moresi (1993).
Proof of Corollary 5: First, we want to derive the ex-ante expected utility
function for an uninformed trader. Recall that the combination of CARA utility


































￿u+￿￿ (uj ￿ u)
￿
:
Using the expression of E(vjuj;p) and ￿U; the previous conditional expected


































1 (￿u + ￿￿)
￿ 1
￿







￿U (v ￿ E(pjuj))
2 :
Conditional on uj; z1 is normally distributed with zero mean and variance






















Since ￿￿1 + 2A > 0; we can apply the Lemma A.1 and operating, using the

















b A = ￿
A2
2￿" + A2
1￿(￿u + ￿￿) ￿ ￿"￿￿A2￿
￿
￿A2￿v￿￿



































































Performing similar computations as before, we obtain that the ex-ante ex-
pected utility function for an informed trader is given by
E(U(WI
i )) = ￿
E
￿










Using the fact that ui and uj are identically distributed, from the previous







Proof of Proposition 6: Using Corollary 5, the expressions of ￿U, ￿I and the
















Since in equilibrium ￿ > 0, it follows that sign(R0(￿)) = sign(￿
0(￿)). In
an equilibrium ￿ ￿ f(￿) = 0:When the equilibrium is regular, we can apply





1￿f0(￿). Using the fact that
@f
@￿ > 0; it follows that sign(R0(￿)) = sign(1 ￿ f0(￿)):
Proof of Corollary 7: Using the expression of f(￿); we get that, when ￿(1 ￿
￿) = 0; f(￿) is a constant function, and obviously, in this case there is one
equilibrium and it is stable. Suppose now that ￿(1 ￿ ￿) 6= 0: In this case f(￿) is
a decreasing function. Taking into account this fact, and that f(0) > 0 and lim
￿!1
f(￿) = 0; it follows that the equilibrium is unique. Concerning to stability of the
equilibrium notice that, di⁄erentiating f(￿) and evaluating at the ￿xed point, we
35get f0(￿) = ￿
2(1￿￿)￿u￿
2￿
￿2￿￿u(1￿￿)+￿" < 0: The stability of the equilibrium requires that
￿f0(￿) < 1: Direct computations yield that the previous inequality is satis￿ed









(1￿￿)￿u￿); since the function ￿ ￿ f(￿) is increasing, which is
equivalent to 4
￿2￿2￿u￿" > (1 ￿ ￿)￿:
Proof of Corollary 8: When ￿ = 0; we have









2 ￿ ￿ + ￿￿￿" = 0:
Notice that P(￿) is a polynomial of degree 2 in ￿. Therefore, we can explicitly
compute the roots of this polynomial. If 1 < 4￿"￿￿￿￿2; the polynomial P(￿)
has no real roots and, hence, we conclude that a SLE does not exist. Otherwise,
that is, if 1 ￿ 4￿"￿￿￿￿2; then ￿1 and ￿2 are the roots of P(￿); whose expressions
are given in the statement of this corollary.
In relation to stability, straightforward computations yield 0 < f0(￿1) < 1
and f0(￿2) > 1: Consequently, the equilibrium with the lowest value of ￿ is
stable and the other equilibrium is unstable.
Proof of Corollary 9: Note that in this case the ￿xed-point equation can be
written as







￿u+￿￿; ￿ = ￿"
￿u+￿￿; and ￿ = ￿ (￿u + ￿￿): Di⁄erentiating f(￿), we
get





Notice that if (1￿￿)￿ = 0; then the equilibrium is unique since f(￿) is constant.
Suppose that (1 ￿ ￿)￿ 6= 0: From the ￿xed-point equation, we have that in a
solution of the ￿xed-point equation
￿ =
￿




Substituting this expression in the formula of f0(￿); we get










We wonder under which conditions there exists a ￿xed point such that f0(￿) = 1:
Let z = ￿
2; the previous equality is equivalent to
36z2 (￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) + z￿(￿ ￿ 2￿ ￿ ￿￿) ￿ ￿2￿ = 0: (16)
The polynomial in the LHS has a discriminant equal to ￿￿2 (1 ￿ ￿)(￿8￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿￿):
We distinguish two cases: 1) ￿8￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿￿ < 0 and 2) (￿8￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿￿) ￿ 0:
￿ Case 1: ￿8￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿￿ < 0: In this case the discriminant is negative.
Hence,
z2 (￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) + z￿(￿ ￿ 2￿ ￿ ￿￿) ￿ ￿2￿ < 0 for all z: This implies that
in any ￿xed point f0(￿) < 1: Hence, we conclude that the equilibrium is unique.




￿2￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
p
￿(￿ ￿ 1)(8￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)
￿





￿2￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿￿ +
p
￿(￿ ￿ 1)(8￿ ￿ ￿ + ￿￿)
￿
2(￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿￿)
:
Using the fact that z = ￿
2, substituting the expressions of z and z in (15),
we have three subcases:
￿if ￿8￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿￿ > 0 and ￿ = ￿; we have two ￿xed points, in one








2(￿+￿￿￿￿) and satis￿es that
f0(￿) = 1;
￿if ￿8￿+￿￿￿￿ > 0 and ￿ = ￿; we have two ￿xed points, in one of








2(￿+￿￿￿￿) and satis￿es that
f0(￿) = 1; and
￿if ￿8￿+￿￿￿￿ = 0, and ￿ = ￿ = ￿ =
q
(￿+8)2
27￿￿2 , there is a unique




In addition, notice that @
@￿f(￿) > 0 and @
@￿f0(￿) > 0 whenever (1￿￿)￿ 6= 0:
Taking into account all these properties and the fact that ￿ = ￿ (￿u + ￿￿), we
obtain the stated results of this corollary.
Proof of Corollary 10: In this case the ￿xed-point equation can be rewritten
as
￿ = f(￿) = ￿
￿
￿￿















2(￿ ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿
￿
￿




37Notice that if (￿ ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 0; then we get uniqueness of the equilibrium
since the function f(￿) is decreasing. Suppose now that (￿ ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿) < 0:










2 (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿
￿: (17)










2(￿ ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿
￿




We wonder under which conditions there exists a ￿xed point such that f0(￿) = 1
Let z = ￿
2; the previous equality is equivalent to
z￿(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ 3￿) ￿ ￿2 ￿ z2￿￿(￿ ￿ 1)
2 = 0: (18)
The polynomial in the LHS has a discriminant equal to ￿2 (￿ ￿ 1)
2 (￿ ￿ 9￿)(￿ ￿ ￿):
We distinguish two cases: 1) ￿ ￿ 9￿ < 0; and 2) ￿ ￿ 9￿ ￿ 0:
￿ Case 1: ￿ ￿ 9￿ < 0: In this case the discriminant is negative. Hence,
z￿(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ 3￿) ￿ ￿2 ￿ z2￿￿(￿ ￿ 1)
2 < 0 for all z. This implies that
in any ￿xed point f0(￿) < 1: Consequently, the equilibrium is unique.




(￿ ￿ 3￿) ￿
p







(￿ ￿ 3￿) +
p




Using the fact that z = ￿
2, substituting the expressions of z and z in (17),
we have three subcases:
















and satis￿es that f0(￿) = 1;
















and satis￿es that f0(￿) = 1; and




9￿+1), we have a unique
￿xed point.
38Notice that @
@￿f(￿) > 0 and @
@￿f0(￿) > 0 whenever (￿ ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿) < 0:
Taking into account all these properties and the fact that ￿ = ￿ (￿u + ￿￿), we
obtain the stated results of this corollary.




2(￿ ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿
￿
￿











2￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿
￿3 :
Note that if ￿ ￿ ￿; then the function f(￿) has an increasing S-shape. Combining
this result with the fact f(0) > 0 and lim
￿!1
f(￿) < 1, we get three possibilities:
1) in case of uniqueness of the SLE, generically 0￿ f0(￿) < 1 at the equilibrium;
which implies that the equilibrium is stable.
2) in case of two SLE, 0< f0(￿) < 1 in one equilibrium and f0(￿) = 1 in
the other equilibrium. This implies that there is one stable equilibrium and one
unstable equilibrium.
3) in case of three SLE, 0 < f0(￿) < 1 in the two equilibria with extreme
values of ￿, whereas f0(￿) > 1 in the equilibrium with the intermediate value
of ￿. Hence, the two ￿rst equilibria are stable and the last one is unstable.
Suppose now that ￿ > ￿: In this case f0(￿) < 0; and therefore, there is a
unique equilibrium. The stability of the ￿xed point requires that ￿f0(￿) < 1:
Direct computations yield that this inequality is equivalent to
k(￿) > 0; (19)
where k(b) = ￿2+b4￿￿(￿ ￿ 1)
2+b2￿(1 ￿ ￿)(￿￿ + 3￿): We distinguish 3 cases:
1) ￿ < ￿ < 9￿; 2) ￿ = 9￿; and 3) 1 > ￿ > 9￿:
￿ Case 1: ￿ < ￿ < 9￿: In this case the polynomial k(x); where x = b2; has
a negative discriminant and, consequently, it does not have any real root.
In all values the polynomial is positive, and in particular, in the ￿xed
point. This implies that (19) holds. Hence, we get that the equilibrium is
stable.











3￿(￿9￿+1) a. s.. This implies that (19) holds a.s.. Hence, we get that
the equilibrium is stable a.s..






￿ ￿ 3￿ ￿
p









￿ ￿ 3￿ +
p
(￿ ￿ 9￿)(￿ ￿ ￿)
￿
:
39The condition (19) is satis￿ed whenever the ￿xed point satis￿es ￿ <b or
￿ > b. Since the function ￿ ￿ f(￿) is strictly increasing, the previous in-
equalities hold if and only if b > f(b) or b < f(b): Moreover, the inequality




12￿2 ￿ 9￿￿ + ￿2 + (4￿ ￿ ￿)
￿p
(￿ ￿ 9￿)(￿ ￿ ￿)
￿￿
￿3 (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿9￿ + 5￿ ￿ 3
p





















: Some algebra tells








g(￿) = 0: Let ￿1 and ￿2







12￿2 ￿ 9￿￿ + ￿2 + (4￿ ￿ ￿)
￿p
(￿ ￿ 9￿)(￿ ￿ ￿)
￿￿
￿3 (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿9￿ + 5￿ ￿ 3
p










12￿2 ￿ 9￿￿ + ￿2 + (￿ ￿ 4￿)
p
(￿ ￿ 9￿)(￿ ￿ ￿)
￿
￿3 (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿9￿ + 5￿ + 3
p




Then, taking into account that ￿ = ￿ (￿u + ￿￿); we obtain
￿for all ￿ < ￿1 = ￿1
￿u+￿￿; 1 < g(￿) < g(￿); and hence, we conclude
that the equilibrium is stable,
￿for all ￿ > ￿2 = ￿2
￿u+￿￿; g(￿) < g(￿) < 1; and hence, we conclude
that the equilibrium is stable, and
￿for all ￿ 2 [￿1;￿2];g(￿) ￿ 1 ￿ g(￿); and hence, we conclude that
the equilibrium is unstable.
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